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RECENT CASE NOTES
imaginary constitutional barrier around the exterior confines of the United
States for the purpose of shutting that government off from the exertion
of powers which inherently belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty." This
same language was quoted by Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion in the
principal ease as supporting the decision.
It is clear, then, that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as to jurisdiction of the States to tax intangibles means one thing,
and that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment has an altogether
different meaning when applied to the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. As to the latter, due process as to substance apparently has no
meaning, but is a restraint on the Federal Government's power only as to
matters of procedure.
But is this inconsistency in fact justified? In Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota,9 the Court said: "Primitive conditions have passed; business is now transacted on a national scale. A very large part of the country's wealth is invested in negotiable securities whose protection against
discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxation, is matter of the greatest
moment." Do not these same arguments apply with nearly equal force
today in international commerce? The Court notes the fact that "jurisdiction (to tax) may exist in more than one government, that is, jurisdiction
based on distinct grounds," and cites Winams v. Attorney-General,o an
English case, to show that England has upheld the same tax on the same
ground-that there is no international limitation preventing-and further
states that the nations at present recognize the fact that double or multiple
taxation raises a problem, and are working together in an effort to find a
solution for it.
There is an even more important question to consider. What effect will
the case have on American business? Is it not obvious that many subjects
and residents of other countries who, in the past, have kept property of the
nature involved here in this country, allowing the income to be collected
and deposited in American banks, will, in the future, take this property
out of the country for the purpose of avoiding the tax? Regarding the matter from a business standpoint alone, is it not probable that the government
would eventually profit most by allowing what money it could collect from
such estates as death duties to be lost, and keep such property in the
country?
W. T. H.
TRUSTS--INSOLVENT BANxS--TRACING TRUST PRoPE&TY-April 18, 1930,
the City Trust Company, as executor of the will of James Fordice French.
paid over to itself as trustee under a trust created by the same will, the
sum )f $90,000 in cash. This money was commingled with all other money
in the hands of the Company and turned over to the banking department
as cash. All but $38,679.68 was invested by the Company for the benefit of
the trust. October 23, 1930, the City Trust Company went into hands of a
receiver with cash on hand amounting to $18,255.76. The cash on hand was
never less than that amount after the trust fund was deposited. Claimant
is the duly appointed present trustee of the French trust and claims a pre'Note 4, supra.
10(1910)
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ferred claim to the extent of $38,679.68 upon all funds in the hands of the
receiver of the City Trust Company. Held, that there was a preferred claim
to the extent of $18,255.76 which was the largest sum that could be presumed to have remained in the hands of the Company from the deposit on
April 18, 1930, that augmented the assets that passed into the hands of the
receiver. Judgment for the claimant, reversed in part.'
The relationship of debtor-creditor was never created between the two
departments of the City Trust Company. The method of keeping books
could not in any way jeopardize the rights of the beneficiary under the
trust.2

It is agreed in all cases and authorities that if a trustee becomes insolvent with trust property in his hands and the trust property can be
traced ino the hands of the receiver that the cestui que trust is entitled to
a preferred claim against the assets held by the receiver. The dispute is as
to what constitutes a sufficient tracing of the trust property into the hands
of the receiver. There are three distinct rules on this point. The most
strict rule is that the identical, particular, and specific property has to be
found in the receiver's hands so as to directly augment the assets held by
him. Under this strict rule it would be practically impossible to get a preferred claim in case of money being the trust property. To prove such
claim it would necessitate earmarking the specific coins or bills or taking
the numbers of the bills. The operative effect of this rule seems to be that
as soon as the trust money is commingled with the trustees own money, no
matter what the proportion is, so that the strict identity is lost, and the
trustee goes into receivership, the trust money is no longer trust money and
the relation between the receiver and the beneficiary becomes debtorcreditor.S
In extreme contrast to the strict rule there is the very liberal rule which
presumes, after the trust is proven, that the property has gone into the
hands of the receiver and has increased the assets held by him. The practical result of this rule is that no tracing is required at all after the trust is
proven. However, it is held that the presumption is a rebutable one and if
it is shown that the original trust fund could not possibly have gone into
4
the hands of the receiver no preferred claim will be allowed.
The decided weight of authority adopts the rule as set out in the principal case. It is a more moderate view than the two extreme rules set out
above. This rule requires that there be a substantial identification of the
trust property, and in case it consists of money, the identical coins or bills
do not have to be traced, but only the original trust money as a fund has to
be identified. The operative effect of this rule, as in the principal case, is
1
ottger v. First-Merchants' Arat'l Bank of Lafayette, Appellate Court of Indiana, San. 31, 1933, 184 N. E. 267.
2 Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, and cases cited. (1932) 181 N. E. 369.
3Perry, Trusts, 836, 1916C, L. IL A. 21, Exhaustive note on subject; Byrne v.
Byrne (1896), 113 Cal. 294, 45 Pac. 536; Mathewson v. Wakelee (1910), 83 Conn.
75, 75 Atl. 93; Collins v. Steuart (1899), 58 N. T. Eq. 392, 44 AU. 467; Davis v.
Shepard (1925), 135 Wash. 124, 237 Pac. 21.
4MoLeod v. Evans (1886), 66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173. This is the leading case
,on this view but It is expressly overruled in Wisconsin by Nonotuok Silk Co. v.
Flanders (1894), 87 Wis. 237, 58 N. W. 383; Myers v. Board of Education (1893),
51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac. 658, 37 Am. St. Rep. 263; State v. Bruce, Rec. (1909), 17
Idaho 1, 102 Pac. 831, 19160, D. R. A. 1; Eastman v. Farmers' State Bank (1928),
175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236.
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that the lowest cash on hand held by the trustee from the time he acquires
the trust money to the time he goes into receivership will be the largest sum
that will be presumed to have remained of the original trust money that
passed into the hands of the receiver. 5
The law in Indiana on this subject of tracing misappropriated trust
funds has gone through an evolution and period of growth before the rule
as announced in the principal case was reached. The first case found on
the subject stated a rule which sounds like the strict doctrine, as it was
said that if the trustee did not preserve the identity as well as the existence
of the funds and if he paid out the money as his own, the trust is practically at an end.6 However, it was only a few years later that the extreme
strictness was taken out of the rule as first stated and the property in
which the trust fund was wrongfully invested was subjected to the trust.7
This case is the basis of the modern Indiana law as to tracing trust property. Later in the same year the court went back to the strict view by
requiring the trust fund to be "distinctly identified,"5 but this limitation
was impliedly repudiated in still later cases which adopted the rule as stated
in the previous case. 9
The first case involving a bank as trustee, as in the principal case, was
one in the Appellate Court.1o In this case the Indiana rule as set out in
the principal case was stated. Two years later the Supreme Court adopted
the same rule in the same general language though it did not cite this case.
Thus at this early date, the Indiana rule was apparently settled with the
cases immediately following in accord.11 But in the next several years
there are a number of cases in point and several follow the supposedly settled rule12 but as pointed out in the principal case there are some that tend
to deviate. Two of the decisions tend to support the old strict rule as to
confusion of goods,'3 while another states the liberal view and cites together
McLeod v. Evans, which is the leading authority on the liberal rule, and
u Albert Pick & Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Bank (1923), 196 Iowa 706, 195
N. W. 378, 31 A. T,. IL 466; ionotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, supra, note 4; Massey
v. Fisher (1894), 62 Fed. 958; Smith v. Fuller (1912), 86 Ohio St. 57, 99 N. ]. 214,
1916C, L. X. A. 6; Kent v. Kent (1917), 50 Utah 44, 165 Pac. 271; Central Nat.
Bank v. First Nat. Bank (1927), 115 Nebr. 444, 213 N. W. 745, 216 N. W. 302;
Leach v. Iowa State Sav. Bank (1927), 204 Iowa 497, 215 X. W. 728; City of Lincoln v. Morrison (1902), 64 Nebr. 822, 90 N. W. 905; Iz re Arms' Estate (1921),
186 Cal. 554, 199 Pac. 1053; Schuyler v. Littlefield, Trustee (1914), 232 U. S. 707,
58 L. Ed. 806, 34 S. Ct. 466; St. Louft, etc., Co. v. Spiller (1927), 274 U. S. 304,
71 L. Ed. 1060, 47 G. Ct. 634.
GState v. Sanders (1878), 62 Ind. 562.
7Bundy, Rec., v. The Town of Monticello (1882), 84 Ind. 119.
$McComas v. Long (1882), 85 Ind. 549.
9Riehl v. The Evansville Foundry Assoc. (1885), 104 Ind. 70, 3 N. 3. 633;
Rowley, Adm., v. Fair (1885), 104 Ind. 189, 3 N. E. 860; Orb v. Coapstick (1893),
136 Ind.
313, 36 N. E. 278.
10
OWindstanley v. Second National Bank (1895), 13 Ind. App. 544, 41 N. D. 956.
"12 Pearce v. Dill (1897), 149 Ind. 136, 48 N. E2. 788.
Shepard, Trustee, v. The Meridian Nat'l Bank (1897), 149 Ind. 532, 48 N. E.
346; Union Nat'l Bank v. Citizrt= Bank (1899), 153 Ind. 44, 54 N. E. 97; Hanna
v. McLaughlin (1901), 158 Ind. 292, 63 N. ]. 475; cited in dissenting opinionMiller v. Stephenson (1901), 27 Ind. App. 271, 59 N. E. 398; Porter V. Roseman
(1905), 165 Ind. 255, 74 N. E. 1105, 112 Am. St. Rep. 222, 6 Ann. Can. 718.
U Indiana Trust Co. v. InternationalBuilding 4 Loan Assoc. (1905), 165 Ind.
597, 76 N. ]. 304; Reserve, etc., Ins. Co. v. Dulin, Rec. (1924), 82 Ind. App. 630,
135 N. E. 90.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the Windstanley and Shopert cases as stating the same rule.14 Thus the
law that was supposedly settled became again unsettled. With the law in
this state, in a relatively recent case, the Supreme Court definitely adopted
the rule as stated in the Windstmney case1 5 and the later cases have followed this view.16 In one case the opinion is misleading as to which rule
is being followed but the result seems to be in accord with the settled
view.17 At the present time the law in Indiana on this point is apparently
settled as stated in the principal case as to banks acting as trustee and
becoming insolvent before March 11, 1931. If any bank acting as trustee
should become insolvent after that date, a statute declares that the fund
held in trust shall be a preferred claim over general creditors.18 There is
a more recent case which cites with approval the principal case without
J. W.
stating its holding.19
WoRx AN'S COMPENSATION-ARISING OUT OP THE EMPLOYMLNT-The
appellant alleged that, on the 14th day of April, 1931, he received certain
personal injuries by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment in the appellee's factory, by reason of which he lost his
left eye. When no agreement, as to compensation, could be reached, the
appellant filed his application with the Industrial Board, on account of said
injuries, on the 5th day of June, 1931, and was heard by a single member
of the board, who found in favor of the appellant. The appellee on the 28th
day of October, 1931, filed an application for a review by the full board,
which found that the appellant's alleged accidental injury was not the
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
The appellant appealed, assigning as error that "the finding and order of
the Full Industrial Board is contrary to law." Hed, the accidental injury
did not cause the disability of the appellant.'
The court, without an analysis of the causal relation of the accident,
the injury and the employment, affirmed the award of the Industrial Board
by following the rule, that, where there is some evidence to support the
finding, the award is conclusive, if there has been proper notice and a full

"State v).Farmers& Merchants Nat. Bank (1919), 71 Ind. App. 216, 124 N. E.
501.

0 Fletcher Savings & Trust Co. v. American State Bank (1925), 196 Ind. 118,

147 N. E. 524.

1Crowder, Rec., v. Sanduscy (1929), 91 Ind. App. 200, 170 N. E. 792; Allen
SSteen Acceptance Co. v. Cook, Rec. (1930), 93 Ind. App. 682, 173 N. E. 460;
Crowder v. Abbott (1931), 178 N. E. 860; Mock v. Stultz (1932), 179 N. E. 561;
Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott (1932), 181 N. E. 369.
ST~tults, Ree., 'v. Gordon, Adm. (1929), 89 Ind. App. 611, 167 N. E. 564.
"8Acts 1931, Chapter 167, page 580. That hereafter, upon the insolvency, suspension or liquidation of any bank of discount and deposit, or loan and trust and
safe deposit company, while acting as executor, administrator, receiver, guardian,
assignee, commissioner, agent, attorney-in-fact, or in any other fiduciary capacity,
the person or persons beneficially entitled to receive the property and proceeds held
in trust by it as aforesaid, or its successors In trust, shall have preference and
priority over its general creditors in all assets of such bank or loan and trust and
safe deposit company, for all uninvested funds so held in trust to the extent of any
commingling with its general assets or which may iiot be duly accounted for.
"Rottger v. Delta Delta Delta Realty Corporation (1933), 184 N. E. 412.
'Hess v. Ohlen Bishop Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 15, 1932. 18&
N. E. 387.

